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Listen, we're in town for six weeks, right? - and I'm just
talking now, so jump in - but what, say ... and this is
perfect, what with the breakup thing you got going, too..
. but say we were to find some gal - and I know we've
got a shitload of stuff to get done, I know that, but for the
sake of argument, let's just say we stumbled on to
somebody, okay? - so, this person is just vulnerable as
hell, right? Young thing, the wallflower type, whatever -
or disfigured in some way, I don't know - but some
woman who is pretty sure that life ... and I mean a full,
healthy sexual life, romance, stuff like that ... is lost to
her forever. Okay? Anyway, we take a girl that type -
some cornfed bitch who'd practically mess her pants if
you sharpen a pencil for her! - and we both [pretend to
fall in love with her.] You know? You and me upping
the ante all the time . . .she's suddenly got two men!
She's crazy with joy, she's wearing makeup again! And
on we play, and on and on! And then one day, out goes
the rug, and us pulling it hard and "Jill," she comes
tumbling after .... Hour later we are back on a flight to
civilization like nothing happened. Trust me, she will be
reaching for the sleeping pills within a week and we'll
laugh about this 'til we're very old men ... what do you
think?
"Chad," while speaking with "Howard" in the film,
"In the Company of Men"
2
J.D., University of Pennsylvania; B.A., University of California, San Diego.
Clerk for the Honorable James T. Giles, Chief Judge of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. I am greatly indebted to those who gave commentary on previous
drafts or engaged in involved discussions with me before the first draft was
written: Leo Katz, Michael Moore, Joe Farber, Paul Litton, Craig Green, and
Myrna Gabbe. Special thanks to the staff of the Touro Law Review for their
help with research. The views in this article are mine, and not those of my
employer.
2 Script available in Neil LaBute, IN THE COMPANY OF MEN (1997).
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I was 14 and my neighbor was 16. He had just
gotten a red Firebird for his birthday and we went
driving around. We just happened to drive past the
local pizza place and we saw a delivery boy getting
into his car .... We could see the pizza boxes in
the back seat. When the pizza boy pulled into a
highrise apartment complex, we were right behind
him. All of a sudden, my neighbor said, "You
know, it would be easy to take a pizza!" . . . I
looked at him, he looked at me, and without saying
a word I was out of the door ... got a pizza and ran
back . . . . (As I remember, neither of us was
hungry, but the pizza was the best we'd ever eaten.)
Student, University of California, Los Angeles
3
At first, the two accounts listed above seem to have little in
common. The fictional speaker in the first excerpt explains his evil
plan to amuse himself and his co-worker, Howard, by intentionally
causing severe emotional harm to another. Chad and Howard
succeed in their plan. Feigning kindness and affection, Chad
courts a young, deaf woman named Christine for weeks, eventually
relishing in telling her that neither he nor his friend were the least
bit interested in her. "I was going to let you down easy," says
Chad, once Christine reveals she suspects his scheme, "but I can't
keep a straight face, . . . so fuck it. Surprise ... so, how does it
feel? ' 4 Meanwhile, the speaker from the second excerpt seems to
successfully engage in fairly harmless mischief by stealing a pizza
and adding to the thrill of a night out with a friend who had just
become old enough to drive. What unites the two acts is their
wrongness. Nearly all would agree that both Chad's
misrepresentations and the fourteen-year-old's pizza theft were
morally wrong. People should not intentionally hurt others or steal
the property of others. Further, most would agree that the actions
of Chad and his comrade were morally worse, by an order of
magnitude, and deserves much more punishment than the actions
3 JACK KATZ, SEDUCTIONS OF CRIME 52 (Basic Books 1988).
4 Neil LaBute, IN THE COMPANY OF MEN (1997).
5 KATZ, supra note 3.
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of the young pizza thieves. In reality, our system of criminal
punishment would leave Chad and Howard untouched, while
legislatures pass criminal statutes that put a person in jail for
stealing the "food or drink" of another "with the purpose to deprive
him thereof.",
6
For some reason, the likes of Chad and Howard have
always been able to commit moral wrongs without facing
punishment by incarceration or any other act of the state. The
government punishes wrongs more related to person and property,
such as murder, assault, or pizza theft.7 Other wrongs, like
6 MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 223.0(6) and 223.2. Section 223.0(6) states:
In this Article, unless a different meaning plainly is required:
"property" means anything of value, including real estate,
tangible and intangible personal property, contract rights,
chose-in-action and other interests in or claims to wealth,
admission or transportation tickets, captured or domestic
animals, food and drink, electric or other power.
Id.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.2 (1) provides: "A person is guilty of theft if he
unlawfully takes, or exercises unlawful control over, movable property of
another with purpose to deprive him thereof." Id.
7 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 states in pertinent part:
[C]riminal homicide constitutes murder when; (a) it is
committed purposely or knowingly; or (b) it is committed
recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life. Such recklessness and
indifference are presumed if the actor is engaged or is an
accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or
flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, rape
or deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat of force, arson,
burglary, kidnapping or felonious escape. (2) Murder is a
felony of the first degree ....
Id.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(1) provides:
(1)Simple Assault. A person is guilty of assault if he:
(a) attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly
causes bodily injury to another; or
(b) negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly
weapon; or
(c) attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of
imminent serious bodily injury.
Simple assault is a misdemeanor unless committed in a fight
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manipulating loved ones or intentionally undermining the
confidence of one's colleagues, never bring state-inflicted
suffering for the offenders. This fact about state-imposed
punishment poses some problems for the way punishment is
understood and justified by both moral philosophers and the
general public.
I believe the existence of cases such as those above casts
doubt on retributivism. 8 There is extensive philosophical debate
over why we punish people, with the explanation I find the most
plausible being made by moral philosophers known as
"retributivists." While an ordinary citizen usually assumes people
are put in jail for the safety of the public, to deter further criminal
acts, and because the offender deserves poor treatment by virtue of
the wrongness of her act, a retributivist would counter that
"punishment is pro erly inflicted because, and only because, the
person deserves it."
The retributive position is best understood by considering if
the state should punish someone even if doing so would not
achieve any goal other than giving an individual his just deserts.
Professor Michael S. Moore gives the following example:
Imagine [that after committing a brutal rape] but
before sentencing the defendant has gotten into an
accident so that his sexual desires are dampened to
such an extent that he presents no further danger of
rape; if money is also one of his problems, suppose
further that he has inherited a great deal of money,
so that he no longer needs to rob. Suppose, because
Id.
8 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5(a)(6) (3d ed. 2000). Retribution,
synonymous with retributivism, is explained as:
By this theory, also called revenge or retaliation, punishment
(the infliction of suffering) is imposed by society on criminals
in order to obtain revenge, or perhaps (under the less
emotional concept of retribution) because it is only fitting and
just that one who has caused harm to others should himself
suffer for it .... Some contend that when one commits a
crime, it is important that he receive commensurate
punishment in order to restore the peace of mind and repress
the criminal tendencies of others.
Id.
9 MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 236 (Cambridge 1984).
338 [Vol 17
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of both of these facts, we are reasonably certain that
he does not present a danger of either forcible
assault, rape, robbery, or related crimes in the
future. Since [the rapist] is (by hypothesis) not
dangerous, he does not need to be incapacitated...
or reformed. Suppose further that we could
successfully pretend to punish [him], instead of
actually punishing him, and that no one is at all
likely to find out. Our pretending to punish him
would thus serve the needs of general deterrence
and maintain social cohesion, and the cost to the
state would be less than if it actually did punish
him.10
It would seem wrong to allow the person who committed
this brutal rape to go unpunished even if the goals of deterrence,
rehabilitation, and public safety were not served by the
punishment.1  He deserves punishment by virtue of having done
wrong.12 Also, strong intuitions suggest that we should not punish
an innocent person fbr any reason - not even to appease an angry
mob ready to start 'violence or to create the appearance that the
state has captured a notorious offender, deterring other citizens
from attempting similar crimes. When the convict does not
'o 1(. at 234.
i' LAFAVE, supra note 8, at §§ 1.5(a)(2), 1.5(a)(3), 1.5(a)(4).
Under the theory of deterrence, "the sufferings of the criminal
for the crime he has committed are supposed to deter others
from committing future crimes, lest they suffer the same
unfortunate fate." Under rehabilitation, "also called
correction, or reformation, we 'punish' the convicted criminal
by giving him appropriate treatment, in order to rehabilitate
him and return him to society so reformed that he will not
desire or need to commit further crimes." The notion of the
public safety theory, also known as restraint, or
incapacitation, "is that society may protect itself from persons
deemed dangerous because of their past criminal conduct by
isolating these persons from society."
Id.
12 This is classic retribution theory, that the only reason for punishment is that
one has done wrong. "The offender may justly be subjected to certain
deprivations because he deserves it; and he deserves it because he has engaged
in wrongful conduct -- conduct that does or threatens injury and that is
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deserve punishment, no non-retributivist consideration justifies
punishment. Hence, because only moral wrongdoing can justify
punishment, retributivists believe people should be punished
because they have behaved wrongly and only because they have
behaved wrongly.1
3
But if it is the desert of the wrongdoer that justifies
punishment, why is no such punishment justified for Chad and
Howard? All would agree that they acted more wrongly than the
pizza thieves, but somehow they do not seem to deserve as much -
or even any - punishment by the state. This undermines the
retributivist notion that desert alone justifies punishment. Either
one is forced to conclude that Howard and Chad do not deserve
punishment or that desert alone does not justify punishment. It
certainly seems easier to admit that retributivism does not hold
than to agree that Chad and Howard deserve better treatment than
the pizza thieves. This article will discuss the threat to
retributivism created by the fact that Chad and Howard deserve
much worse treatment than the pizza thieves, yet at the same time
should not be punished as the pizza thieves are punished.
Cases of unpunishable immoralities also seem to suggest a
great deal of injustice in our institutions since many who commit
terrible moral wrongs are never punished, and those who commit
minor wrongs are. Usually, the following three assessments can be
made when comparing two immoral acts: 1) Which act was
morally worse?; 2) Which act deserves more punishment?; and 3)
Which act should receive more punishment from the state? Given
a retributivist account, the answer to the three questions should be
the same. The more morally badly a person acts, the more
punishment he deserves, and the more punishment he should
13 In MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME, 53 (Clarendon Press 1993), author
Michael S. Moore states,
Retributivism, however, is a backward-looking punishment
scheme. For a retributivist, it is a sufficient reason to punish
that the person deserve it, even if such punishment does not
change future behavior at all. The retributivist answer thus
has to lie in the nature of desert. Desert must be such that we
deserve punishment for violations of morality's norms of
obligation, but we do not deserve punishment for violation of
morality's ideals of virtuous character.
340 [Vol 17
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receive from the state. In fact, we usually ask one of the questions
to answer the other two. For example, one might note that he feels
rape is morally worse than a simple assault, and hence should be
punished more by the state. Another person might observe that
insider trading is given less punishment in Japan than in the United
States, so the Japanese must consider insider trading less immoral
than Americans do. 14 However, once one accepts that Chad and
Howard have committed a morally worse act than that of the pizza
thieves, one has difficulty giving the same answer to all three
questions when comparing some acts. One is forced into saying
that a morally worse act somehow does not warrant more
punishment from the state than a morally better act.
There are numerous instances where a different answer is
given to question one (which act is morally worse) and question
three (which act should receive more punishment from the state).
Before considering the examples above, most would suspect that
civic punishment is reserved only for the worst of immoral acts.
People who have committed crimes are thought to act less morally
than law-abiding citizens. After all, civic punishment is extremely
severe and has been noted by one philosopher to include "a brand
of censure and condemnation that leaves one, in effect, in
permanent disgrace. ' ' 15  Most citizens could not conceive of
spending even a week locked away in a jail cell, and indeed, most
believe that they are far from deserving such treatment.
But one must consider the following question: are criminal
wrongs necessarily worse than wrongs not currently deemed
criminal? That is, are acts which can lead to imprisonment always
more immoral than those acts that the law does not punish? The
obvious answer is 'no.' But answering no does not only mean that
rare, unusually devious people, like Chad and Howard, can commit
unpunishable crimes that are worse than criminal acts. Recall that
the pizza thieves' wrong was hardly worthy of overwhelming
moral outrage. Certainly a spouse who coldly and unfeelingly
carries out a host of infidelities or a parent manipulating her
children, hoping to turn them against their estranged father, has
14 See Ranzi Nasser, The Morality of Insider Trading in the United States and
Abroad, 52 OKLA. L. RE'v. 377 (1999).
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also carried out worse wrongs than the pizza thieves. It seems that
many people who could not conceive of spending time behind bars
ordinarily commit acts worse than the pizza thieves.
If retributivists are right - and the state should punish
people to the extent that they deserve it - then it seems unjust that
people like Chad, Howard, the adulterer, and the bad mother go
free while others who commit comparatively minor wrongs receive
state-inflicted moral disapprobation with some element of
permanent disgrace. Justice requires that people get what they
deserve, yet our system seems to punish people who commit minor
wrongs while finding punishment inappropriate for those who
commit much more heinous offenses.
People could argue that Chad, Howard, the adulterer, and
the bad mother would be punished by the state if the state had
more resources. The reason that the law does not punish them is
merely pragmatic. In passing, philosopher Alan Goldman
explained that there are some "moral wrongs whose detection is so
unsure that their prohibition would involve costs too great to be
worthwhile: betrayals of friendship, deceptions in love affairs, and
so on."
16
Goldman's answer assumes that if the government were
able to better detect, for example, deceptions in love affairs, it
would be able to put a deceptive lover on trial and punish her. But
one need merely reflect for a moment about punishing these
previously unpunished acts to see that qualms about state
intervention are more than just a reaction to inefficiency.
The pizza thieves were likely guilty of petty theft which
commentators have suggested should be punishable by up to four
months in prison. 17 An Illinois court upheld a one year prison
sentence for a woman who committed a similar crime, stealing
cigarettes from a supermarket.' 8 As an intuitive matter, we are
unlikely to feel that our adulterous neighbor or perhaps, our own
16 Alan H. Goldman, The Paradox of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT 30, 35
(Simmons et al., eds. 1995).
17 See Kenneth Noble, U.S. Sentencing Plan Urges Fixed Terms and No Parole,
N.Y. TIMES, April 12, 1987, at A16.
18 See Illinois v. Spence, 272 N.E.2d 739, 740, 133 11. App. 2d 171, 171 (1971).
The court rejected the argument that the lower court sentence was excessive and
should be reduced on appeal. See 272 N.E.2d at 742, 133 Ill. App. at 174.
342 [Vol 17
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manipulative parents, should be forced to spend four months or
more in prison. Though such actors have committed wrongs, the
state, for some reason, should not intervene, put them on trial, or
imprison them for such wrongs.
Some could also argue that Chad and Howard did not act as
wrongly as offenders who do face state-imposed punishment.
Upon noting that we do not wish to send the adulterer or the bad
mother to the penitentiary, we may conclude that our initial moral
assessment was wrong. Pizza theft truly is worse than infidelity,
one might suggest, since we are certain a pizza thief may deserve
to be locked up while an adulterer deserves, at most, resentment
and indignation.
This position is indeed plausible. If a particular act deserves
more punishment (question two), perhaps it must also be more
wrong (question one). After all, it seems the questions of "does an
act deserve more punishment?" and "is an act morally worse?"
should be answered the same way. Though tempting, giving up on
the intuition that a vast number of unpunishable acts are morally
worse than pizza theft would be a grave error. I will explain below
that it is in fact the third question, "which act should receive more
punishment from the state?," that can be answered differently than
the questions of "which act deserves more punishment?," and
"which act is morally worse?" I will show that we can often be
certain that the acts like those of the adulterer and the bad mother
are morally worse than minor crimes, deserve more punishment,
and yet, should not be punished more by the state. We make a
mistake when we infer from the fact that an act should not be
punished by the state that the act deserves less punishment than
criminal acts, or that the act is morally better than criminal acts.
Part II of this paper will show that the standard retributivist
account of state-imposed punishment needs refinement to account
for the absence of state punishment for a whole host of moral
wrongs. I will conclude that the state is constrained by certain
principles of liberty that keep it from imposing retribution on
evildoers like Chad and Howard.
Part III will use concepts of resentment and poetic justice to
show that those who have committed moral wrongs but should not
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But there are important implications to the fact that acts the
state should punish are different than the acts that deserve
punishment. Part IV will assert that the difference between when
the state should punish and when a person deserves punishment
undermines the retributivist claim that desert justifies punishment.
Some tentative remarks will suggest state-inflicted punishment
may actually be justified by criminals' violation of the rights of
others. I will also explore the possibility that, since punishment
seems to turn on whether the offender violated certain rights of
others, moral desert may have no place in determining if and how
much the state punishes someone.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF LIBERTY AND HOW IT CAN
NOT BE OVERRIDDEN BY THE RETRIBUTIVISTS'
NOTION OF DESERT
The existence of unpunishable immoralities suggests that
the state often cannot punish individuals who have done wrongly
because such punishment would violate the liberty interests of the
offenders. Retributivists take issue with consequentialists who
justify punishment by pointing to some important state interest
such as deterring crime or increasing safety. Retributivists feel
that such ends do not justify infringing on the rights of citizens.19
The State could not strip the average innocent citizen of her rights
because it would somehow enhance the safety of the streets, so
fulfilling the end of safety can not be a sole justification for
punishment. What retributivists fail to recognize is that their
account of punishment is open to the same type of criticism since
people could not be stripped of their liberties simply because they
were judged to deserve punishment. Amartya Sen's critique of
Utilitarianism, for example, applies just as strongly to retributivists
as Utilitarians.
A. Sen's Account of Liberty's Importance and His Critique of
Utilitarians
19 See MOORE, supra note 9, at 237.
[Vol 17
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Amartya Sen explains the importance of liberty to show the
limitations of utilitarianism. Sen considers two individuals, Lewd
and Prude.2" Lewd derives great pleasure from reading Lady
Chatterly's Lover, a book by D.H. Lawrence that includes explicit
accounts of sexual experiences. Prude is very annoyed that Lewd
is reading the book and would prefer to read it himself than have to
think "of that depraved Lewd gloating over this terrible stuff."
2 1
Further, if Lewd was given the choice between reading the book
himself, and having Prude read the book, he would prefer the latter
taking "true delight in thinking of that pompous Prude suffering
the consequences of his absurd disposition." 22 Hence, both Prude
and Lewd would gain greater utility (than the default state of
affairs where only Lewd reads Lady Chatterly's Lover) from the
state of affairs in which Prude reads the book and Lewd does not.
A utility-maximizing rule of law would require that Lewd read the
book while Prude be prohibited from doing so. Sen points out that
that even though the rule of law would maximize utility, it must be
rejected. We value liberty, and Lewd is at liberty to read Lady
Chatterly's Lover; while Prude is at liberty to avoid reading the
book. The government should not force either man to read, or not
read, lascivious books, simply because it would maximize utility.
23
Sen's example seems to undermine a utilitarian justification
of punishment. A utility-maximizing rule of law would punish
Lewd for reading the book, while punishing Prude for failing to
read the book. Even though such a rule would maximize utility,
this imposition on liberty is impermissible. It is wrong for the
government to punish Lewd and Prude because they are at liberty
to read what they wish. Of course, the utilitarians would likely
respond to Sen with a recharacterization of the example or of the
utilitarian account. My purpose is not to defend Sen's position
20 Amartya Sen, The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, 78 J. POL. ECON. 152,
155 (1970). See also James S. Fishkin, Justice Versus Utility, 84 COLUM. L.
REv. 263, 268 (1984) (book review).
21 Amartya Sen, Utilitarianism and Welfarism, 76 J. PHIL. 463, 480 (1979).
22 Id.
23 Sen, The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, 78 J. POL. ECON. at 157. Sen
actually refers to a state of the world that is "pareto optimal," as opposed to a
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against utilitarian attack, but to point out the significance of Sen's
account for retributivists' justification of punishment.
B. Retributivism Does Not Justify Infringing on Offenders'
Liberty
Sen's example not only poses problems for utilitarians, it
also poses problems for retributivists who believe that punishment
is justified because offenders who have behaved wrongly deserve
to be punished. Imagine Lewd decided to read Lady Chatterly's
Lover not because he enjoyed it, but because he knew that it would
be the best possible way to cause Prude distress. Imagine further,
that Lewd actually loathed D.H. Lawrence's work as much as
Prude, and only continued to read the work out of sheer spite. In
fact, Lewd would prefer to punch Prude in the face, or steal his car,
than to read the offensive book, but reads on only because Lewd
determined this would cause Prude the most pain and suffering.
As described, it seems that Lewd's action is immoral. He is
causing suffering out of pure spite. Nonetheless, we would still
agree that liberty constrains the government from forcing Lewd not
to read the book. Lewd seems to be behaving immorally, and
seems to deserve punishment. But the liberty constraint binds the
government whether punishing in the name of utility or in the
name of desert.
Unfortunately, the example seems too outlandish to be
explanatory. A person like Prude, who would rather be beat up or
robbed than have an acquaintance read Lady Chatterly's Lover, is
far too unlikely to reveal useful intuitions about the purposes of
punishment. Further, it does not seem that reading Lady
Chatterly's Lover is morally worse than stealing from Prude or
assaulting him; so it seems appropriate for a retributivist to still
believe that a minor assault deserves punishment while
vindictively reading a book does not.2 4 My point is only that the
requirement of protecting liberty is not lifted because the offender
24See LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, AND
KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE LAW 152-157 (The University of Chicago Press
1996). We can imagine that someone suicidal might prefer murder to theft, but
that does not make a person who stole his wallet morally worse than a person
who murdered him. Id.
346 [Vol 17
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acts immorally. Recall that Chad and Howard certainly committed
an act morally worse than theft, and Christine was certainly not
eccentric or outlandish to find the ruse more painful than if Chad
and Howard had simply stolen her car. The government cannot
punish Chad and Howard because they are at liberty to be
manipulative in a relationship and pretend to be caring and
thoughtful even if they are not. Liberty limits state-inflicted
punishment not only in imagined hypotheticals. Our legal system
is filled with examples where people acted wrongly, deserve
punishment, and cannot be punished because the liberty of
offenders constrains government action.
Example 1: Hate Speech
Freedom of speech is one of the liberties we hold dearest,
but this freedom also enables individuals to do evil acts while
remaining untouched by the law. Few could argue that racial
insults, for example, are usually invidiously calculated to harm
people. Some scholars have argued that racial slurs should be
outlawed "because of the immediacy of the injurious impact of
racial slurs." 25 Further, the experience of "being called 'nigger,'
'spic,' 'Jap,' or 'kike,' is like receiving a slap in the face. The
injury is instantaneous." 26 Critical race theorists such as Charles
Lawrence and Richard Delgado27 have noted the evils of such race-
based attacks and advocated they be outlawed. Lawrence reasoned
that racial insults were "undeserving of first amendment protection
because the perpetrator's intention is not to discover truth or
initiate dialogue but ito injure the victim.
28
Unsurprisingly, many scholars and judges disagree with
Laurence. Freedom of speech includes being able to speak when
nearly everyone believes it would be morally bad to say such
things under the circumstances. Laurence Tribe has noted that if
"the Constitution forces government to allow people to march,
25 Charles Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431,452 (1990).
26 id.
27 See Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in
Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 343 (1991).
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speak, and write in favor of peace, brotherhood, and justice, then it
must also require government to allow them to advocate hatred,
racism, and even genocide." 29 A citizen is not at liberty to express
herself if the government prohibits any expression determined to
be immoral and worthy of punishment. A primary purpose of the
First Amendment is to protect speech that is controversial,
unpopular, and unpleasant; speech that the majority of citizens
favor does not need such special protection.
Just as in the more general case of evildoers like Chad and
Howard, the fact that government cannot punish one for immoral
speech shows that liberty cannot be overridden by the retributivist
notion of just deserts. A closer look at punitive prohibitions on
hate speech shows how First Amendment protections are
analogous to the types of liberties enjoyed by Chad and Howard.
In June of 1989, the Board of Regents of the University of
Wisconsin (UW) adopted a rule to discipline students who
intentionally made "racist or discriminatory comments" that were
meant to "intentionally: (1) Demean the race, sex, religion, color,
creed, disability, sexual orientation, national origin, ancestor or age
of the individual or individuals; and (2) Create an intimidating,
hostile, or demeaning environment for education, university-
related work, or other university-authorized activity."3 ° It is hard
to deny that intentionally creating a hostile environment is an
awful and mean-spirited activity that deserves punishment, but
when the rule was actually put in operation, the results seemed
unjust.
Consider the story of one of the first students punished
under the University of Wisconsin Rule:
The University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire found [a
student] violated the UW Rule by yelling epithets
loudly at a woman for approximately ten minutes,
calling her a "fucking bitch" and "fucking cunt."
[The student] was responding to statements the
women made in a university newspaper about the
athletic department. The university placed the
student on probation for a semester and required
29 LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 838 n. 17 (2d ed. 1988).
30 UMW Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis., 774 F. Supp. 1163,
1165 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
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him to perform twenty hours of community service
at a shelter for abused women.
31
It seems clear the perpetrator did something wrong -
something much worse than say, sneaking into the woman's office
and stealing a few dollars from her wallet in retaliation for her
disagreeable comments about the athletic department.
Nonetheless, it does, not seem just to put the vulgar and sexist
sports enthusiast on academic probation and force him to work at a
women's shelter. A Wisconsin federal court agreed and found the
University of Wisconsin rule unconstitutional because "speech
does not lose its protected status merely because it inflicts injury or
disgrace on its addressees. ' 32 Freedom of speech includes the right
to tell people what you think of them, no matter how ignorant,
invidious, or immoral the telling may be.
For those readers who thought the fictional account about
Chad and Howard was too uncommon or outlandish to have any
explanatory force, the Wisconsin incident is a real world example
where the retributive notion of just desert does not justify
punishment, even though the perpetrator did something morally
worse than pizza theft. Also, the example should dispel suspicions
that the phenomena discussed in the introduction can be explained
away by epistemological concerns. Upon reflection, it is not
difficult to concede: that there are unpunished wrongs that are
morally worse than many punished crimes. Many are inclined to
deny the theoretical importance of these unpunishable offenses by
claiming, as philosopher Alan Goldman did, that "betrayal of
friendship, deceptions of love affairs, and so on" are "moral
wrongs whose detection is so unsure that their detection would
involve costs too great to be worthwhile." 33 The act of screaming
obscenities at someone is no more difficult to detect than other
criminal acts like wrongful imprisonment, assault (which does not
require you hit someone, but only that you make them "fear
imminent serious bodily injury" 34), or reckless driving. Regardless
of any concern about detection, hate speech, like betrayals in
friendships and deceptions in love affairs, is not punishable.
31 UAIW Post, 774 F. Supp. at 1167.
321Id. at 1172 n.7.
33 See GOLDMAN, supra note 16.
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Government intervention in friendships, romances, and nonviolent
arguments cannot be justified simply because one of the
individuals committed a moral wrong.
Example Two: The Act Requirement
Generally, the government only punishes people for what
they do, not for what they do not do. Anglo-American law does
not usually hold people liable for failing to help strangers who are
in peril, no matter how grave the danger, or how simple it would
be to rescue the stranger. 35  Our legal tradition includes a
requirement, which, with some exception, limits criminal liability
for harms to instances where the offender committed some act.
Merely failing to act, even when we can agree the offender should
have reported a rape in progress, thrown a drowning woman a
nearby life-preserver, or warned a he blind man as he was about to
walk into a manhole, does not allow the government to punish
someone for the harm she caused.
The act requirement, in fact, allows many instances of
unpunishable immoralities akin to those committed by Chad and
Howard. The most common example is as follows:
Suppose 'A,' standing close by the railroad, sees a
two-year old babe on the track and a car
approaching. He can easily rescue the child with
entire safety to himself. And the instincts of
humanity require him to do so. If he does not, he
may be justly styled a moral monster, but he is not
liable in damages for the child's injury or indictable
under the statute for its death.36
'A' cannot be punished even if he acts as "a moral
monster." He is at liberty to continue to stand in his place near the
railway, even if it would be wrong to do so under the
circumstances. Like all cases of unpunishable immoralities, A's
freedom to do wrong and the state's reluctance to punish omissions
35 FEINBERG, supra note 15, at 127 ("The Statutory law of Great Britain, the
United States, Canada, and Australia has also treated the bad samaritan with
grudging tolerance. Until joined recently by Minnesota the only American state
to enact a criminal bad samaritan statute of the European type was Vermont").36 John Kleinig, Good Samartanism, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 382, 383-84 (1976).
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is troubling. Nonetheless, judges and state legislatures alike are
unwilling to punish people for omissions that cause harm.
A Georgia court would not even consider allegations that a
defendant failed to save a four year-old child from drowning in "a
swimming pool containing in the deep end thereof about 3 feet of
water and the bottom of which, due to the accumulation of leaves,
moss, and other trash and scum, was slippery and slimy."37 The
court explained that "the fact that a person sees another who is
injured does not, of itself, impose on him any legal obligation to
afford relief or assistance, but he might have a strong moral and
humanitarian obligation to do so."
38
Almost no state in America has a statute authorizing
punishment when one citizen fails to come to the aid of another.
39
The state of Vermont has a statute punishing people who do not
render aid to another person who is exposed to "grave physical
harm;" 40 the punishment for violation of the provision is a fine of
"not more than $100.,,41 The Vermont legislature is unwilling to
impose a harsher punishment on someone like 'A,' who watches a
baby be run over by a train, than the punishment for speeding on a
Vermont highway. States are unwilling or unable to give people
their just deserts for their failures to act.
Theorists often justify the act requirement as underlied by
concerns for liberty and the limits of government action. The most
commonly cited explanation of why we cannot punish the immoral
non-actor is the fear of a slippery slope.43 The fear is that if the
government can require a casual bystander to save an imperiled
baby simply because it would be moral to do so, the government
could also require a rich man to give food to a starving beggar or
37 Handiboe v. McCarthy, 151 S.E.2d 905, 907 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966). The
defendant in this case faced civil, not criminal liability.
3 Id. at 907.
39 ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 661 (3d ed. 1982).
40 VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. '12, § 519(a) (1967).
41 Id. § 519(b).
42 FEINBERG, supra note 15, at 127.
" FEINBERG, supra note 15, at 149. Feinberg considers, but does not adopt the
view that, "there is a slippery slope in the application of a bad samaritan rule, so
that it is hard to avoid making into duties actions that are in fact genuinely
supererogatory once we start down that path by making mandatory even the
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require a surgeon to travel many miles because she is the only one
who can perform a life-saving operation." Notice that the ditch at
the bottom of this slippery slope is an excessive government
imposition on liberty. It is not that omissions are somehow
immune from being considered severely immoral. Rather, some
argue, government prohibitions of particular omissions could slide
to a situation where "there are so many people to help, the
government would control how we spend most of our lives. [This
would end] freedom and individuality.
'" 45
Another concern with punishing a failure to act is also a
worry about government restriction of liberty. Theorists are
concerned that requiring people to rescue others takes away our
freedom to choose.46 Indeed, saving a baby does not seem to be a
morally commendable act if the hero only reluctantly offered aid
so a nearby policeman would not arrest him. In order for our
choices to have meaning, and for moral agency to be respected, the
government must allow us the liberty to choose not to rescue a
citizen in need. If the state could restrict any choice that was
morally wrong, then we would no longer be free to choose right or
wrong, and it would be difficult to make moral judgements about
ourselves or others. Hence, this argument about moral agency
concludes, our liberty to do nothing when someone else is in need
cannot be overridden by a retributivist notion of desert. More than
any of the previous examples, the act requirement proves that there
is conduct the government does not punish that is morally worse
and deserves more punishment than other conduct the state does
punish. This point was recognized in the nineteenth century by
Lord Macauley, 47 an English statesman. He agreed that it is "true
that a man who, having abundance of wealth, suffers a fellow
creature to die of hunger at his feet, is a bad man, probably, than
many of those whom we have provided very severe punishment.
' 48
"See Kleinig, supra note 36.
45 FREDERICK SCHAUER & WALTER SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW 820 (Frederick Schaur & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong eds. 1996).
46 Id. at 824.
47 FEINBERG, supra note 15, at 151.48 SCHAUER & SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG, supra note 45, at 819.
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Nonetheless, Macauley did not believe omissions were punishable
simply because they were morally wrong.49
A textbook on legal philosophy similarly observed that
even "if omissions do cause harms, this is not enough to justify
punishing people for causing those harms. Many acts that harm
other people are not subject to punishment., 50  Thus, just like
reading Lady Chatterly's Lover only to annoy someone or
screaming racial epithets at a classmate, omissions are
unpunishable immoralities because of the constraints our liberty
places on government.
The discussion of the act requirement has two implications.
First, it shows that points made throughout this paper about liberty,
retributive just desert, and punishment extend beyond explicit
constitutional requirements and far-fetched hypotheticals. Second,
the act requirement is not an unusual singular exception or a
philosophically empty administrative necessity. Those so struck
by the way the perpetrator of an evil omission remains untouched
by the law should recognize that our commitment to liberty
requires a whole host of evils go unpunished - omissions being
chief among them. Further, philosophers are likely incorrect when
they argue that "our reasons for not prosecuting the callous
bystander are practical rather than moral." 51 The act requirement
is based on important philosophical principles about liberty and
punishment as opposed to being solely the result of difficulties in
drafting a statute, proving omissions occurred, or determining what
types of omissions were morally wrong.
Because one can always exploit one's rights, there are
countless other cases where one can deserve punishment for one's
actions, and still not receive it. Out of sheer spite, a jealous
employer can fire her employee for a minor infraction at work.
One acquaintance can convince another that he would look cooler
if he smoked cigarettes while secretly hoping the he would die of
lung cancer. A child could choose never to speak to his parents
again in hopes that they will both fall into a deep depression. The
state does not have tile power to infringe on rights -and limit liberty
simply in the name of retributive desert. Retributivists must be
4 9  d.
50 Id.
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wrong when they say it is permissible to infringe on the rights of
offenders through punishment because the offenders have
committed moral wrongs and deserve punishment.
III. UNPUNISHABLE ACTS ARE OFTEN AS MORALLY
WRONG AS PUNISHABLE ACTS
When faced with the examples above and their challenge to
a retributive desert-based justification of punishment, an escape
becomes evident: perhaps acts that are not punishable by the state
- failure to rescue, hate speech, and manipulation of vulnerable
mates - are not really as wrong as criminal acts. Indeed, such a
position has a superficial appeal.
Professor Leo Katz, for example, has noticed that many
seemingly evil acts cannot be punished by the state and has
concluded that such acts must not be as wrong as criminal acts.
52
Professor Katz asks readers to compare a wallet thief to someone
who "lets you (a perfect stranger) drown in a lake when he could
easily throw you a life vest.,, 3 Professor Katz notes that letting
someone drown is "mean and outrageous," but since citizens are
"generally disinclined to punish" such outrageousness, he
concludes that lettin someone drown must be "far more benign"
than a criminal act. He even goes as far as to recommend that
people hire attorneys to instruct them how to achieve their most
desired ends (such as, by implication, having a hated stranger
drown) by committing only unpunishable acts.55 For those who
question the morality of achieving their desired goals through
catastrophic omissions, hurtful words, or manipulation of loved
ones, Professor Katz replies, "there is something to their point, but
only just something. 56
Just because acts cannot be punished by the state, that does
not mean that the acts do not deserve punishment. Consider this
excerpt from an interview with the creator of the film about Chad
and Howard's evil manipulation of Christine:
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354 TOURO LA WREVIEW [Vol 17
20
Touro Law Review, Vol. 17 [2001], No. 2, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol17/iss2/3
UNPUNISHABLE IMMORALITY
Question: Chad is a misogynist and a racist. He
betrays and hurts both Christine and Howard. Why
isn't Chad punished for his actions in the end?
Answer: It always seemed more potent to let Chad
get away with everything .... [I hoped to make the
audience] feel that the world is just not right. For
many viewers, it's just not fair that Chad gets
away.
57
When the interviewer asked why Chad was not "punished,"
he was not asking why Chad was not indicted by a state prosecutor
for his evil acts. He: was asking why, by the end of the film, the
repugnant character gets a promotion at work, moved into a nice
new apartment, and continues to live with a girlfriend (other than
Christine) who seems to love him dearly.58 Chad deserved to be
shown for the louse that he was, to be hated by all his colleagues,
to fail in all his pursuits, and maybe, to be hit by a bus. Our
ordinary understanding of punishment, and what it means to
deserve punishment extends well beyond the type of punishment
doled out by the government.
If someone breaks her promise to me, she deserves to feel
guilty. If someone cheats on his wife, he deserves her resentment.
If someone is mean md nasty to everyone they meet, they deserve
not to have any friends. Similarly, if someone is always
manipulative and insincere, yet people continue to revere her as a
kind friend, she has not gotten what she deserves and justice has
not been done. This broad understanding of "just deserts"
demands that the types of unpunishable acts described throughout
this paper be judged to deserve more punishment and be morally
worse than many acts that the state is able to punish. To illustrate
this, I will discuss the concepts of "resentment" and "poetic
justice" below.
A. Resentment
5' LABUTE, supra note 4, at ix.
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Philosophers have long recognized the connection between
wrongness, desert, and resentment.5 When people do wrong, they
deserve to be resented. While if people have not done wrong,
resentment is inappropriate. Professor Katz suggests that we feel a
different way about those who commit legal wrongs than those
who make harmful omissions or insulting comments.60 He never
contends that we do not or should not resent someone who idly
watches while a stranger drowns, but concludes from our
unwillingness to punish the evildoer that people do not, and should
61not, find the omission as objectionable as a criminal act.
However, an examination of our emotional responses to
wrongdoers, both punishable and unpunishable, shows that the
wrongness of acts is unrelated to the state's willingness to impose
punishment for an act.62
Professor Katz's examples begin to convince one that
abiding by the letter of law makes an otherwise objectionable act
moral. For example, Katz tells of a doctor who wishes to take
advantage of bankruptcy laws.63 The doctor "made some unlucky
investments and incurred, let us say, about $20 million worth of
debt which he does not have a prayer of saying off, since his
current assets are little more than $700,000." The doctor exploits
the bankruptcy laws in order to keep as much of his financial worth
as possible. 65 The general thrust of bankruptcy law allows those
facing insurmountable debts to give up what few assets they have
in exchange for their creditors leaving them alone.66 Of course,
debtors do not have to give up all of their assets. 6 7 Depending on
the state you live in, Katz explains, you may not have to give up
"the house you live in, the furniture and various other stuff in it,
your life insurance, and certain kinds of pension plans." 68 Given
59 See, e.g. Kent Greenawalt, Commentary: Punishment, 74 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 343 (1983).
60 ILL-GOTTEN GAINs, supra note 24, at 132.
61 Id. at 131-32.
62 Id. at 132.
63 Id. at 7-8.
64 Id. at 7
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these exceptions, Katz's hypothetical doctor pursues the following
fairly ingenious strategy:
On the eve of declaring bankruptcy the doctor sells
his crummy, old starter home and buys himself a
villa, furnishes it extravagantly, covers the walls
with some Old Masters, decks himself out with a
fur-laden wardrobe, and pours the remaining cash
into life insurance and exempt kinds of pension
plans. 69
It is usually immoral and illegal to purposely break a
promise to pay someone her money. However, this doctor is only
taking advantage of the law of bankruptcy, and he has not done
anything illegal.7 ° Readers may leave Katz's example believing
that it is ordinarily immoral to unjustifiably break promises.
However, taking full advantage of bankruptcy laws to keep one's
assets is far from immoral. The doctor did not wish to pay his
debt, and it may have been wrong to skip town to evade his
creditors. Yet, Katz would conclude, if the doctor achieves his
desired end (keeping his $700,000 in assets) through legal means,
we cannot say that he did anything wrong.71 To the contrary, Katz
would like readers to admire the doctor's savvy financial
maneuvers. As long as one uses legally permissible means, Katz
urges, we cannot classify one's acts as morally wrong.72
The hypothetical bankrupt doctor's acts were fairly
harmless, however availing oneself of the bankruptcy laws would
not always negate the immorality of unjustifiably breaking
promises to one's debtors. Consider the story of real life
69 Id. at 8.
70 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 522.08 (15th ed., 1982). Bankruptcy law
allows a "conversion of non-exempt property into exempt property on the eve of
bankruptcy." Id. See also In re Johnson, 880 F.2d 78 (8th Cir. 1989). But see
In re Reed, 700 F.2d 986, 992. "It would constitute a perversion of the purposes
of the Bankruptcy Code: to permit a debtor earning $180,000 a year to convert
every one of his major assets into sheltered property on the eve of bankruptcy
with actual intent to defraud his creditors and then emerge washed clean of
future obligation by carefully concocted immersion in bankruptcy waters." Id.
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physician-debtor, Dr. Paul Geiger, and the person he stiffed,
Margaret Kawaauhau:
73
Mrs. Kawaauhau came to the doctor after dropping a box
on her foot.74 Her leg was "swollen and red and pus oozed from
beneath the nail of the large toe on her right foot." 75 Dr. Geiger
wished to cut costs on Mrs. Kawaauhau's treatment, so he
prescribed her "oral penicillin, which costs $4.00 per day, in
contrast with intravenous penicillin that costs $40.00 per day.
'76
An expert witness later testified that "Dr. Geiger knew, in fact, that
intravenous penicillin was the appropriate standard of care for this
type of problem and yet he intentionally used something less
effective for the sake of cost."'7 7 Dr. Geiger likely figured his
patient's leg would get better regardless, and there was no sense in
spending any extra money. As a result of Dr. Geiger's negligent
cost-cutting, Mrs. Kawaauhau's leg grew steadily worse and had to
be amputated.78 Mrs. Kawaauhau sued Dr. Geiger for medical
malpractice and won a hefty award.79 However, Geiger carried no
malpractice insurance.80 After the judgement, the doctor moved
from his residence in Hawaii to St. Louis, Missouri where he
declared bankruptcy in order to discharge his debt to Mrs.
Kawaauhau. 81 Now, imagine Dr Geiger had engaged in some
financially savvy conversions of his current assets. He is free to
exploit the exemptions of bankruptcy statutes, which, depending
on Missouri law and the amount of his assets, could mean he could
sink his assets into a 'fur-laden wardrobe' or an 'extravagant villa'
73 In Re Paul Geiger, 172 B.R. 916 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1994). I got the idea of
examining a bankruptcy proceeding that followed a malpractice suit from a
comment made by David Dudley during a Spring 1998 Law and Morality
seminar at the University of Pennsylvania Law School.74 Id. at 917.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 918.
77 Id. at 919.
78 Id. at 918.
79 Geiger, 172 B.R. at 919 (awarding Ms. Kawaauhau special damages in the
amount of $203,040 and general damages in the amount of $90,000. The court
also awarded her husband, a plaintiff in the lawsuit, general damages for loss of
consortium in the amount of $18,000 and emotional distress in the amount of
$35,000, for a total award of damages of $355,040).80 In Re Geiger, 113 F. 3d 848, 859 (8th Cir. 1997).
s Geiger, 172 B.R. at 919.
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without giving a penny to his sole creditor. Further, we can
imagine the newly one-legged Mrs. Kawaauhau being forced to do
without any compensation from the doctor. She may be unable to
continue to work, pay for her past or present hospital bills, or, for
that matter, pay her rent. She may also be unable to afford the
latest prosthetic device. Dr. Geiger could lounge around his new
St. Louis villa in his fur robe, while Mrs. Kawaauhau spends her
days hobbling around waiting rooms in Hawaii's welfare offices
and crowded public hospitals.
Given these circumstances, Mrs. Kawaauhau certainly
would resent Dr. Geiger. He caused her serious personal and
medical harm and, even though he had the means to help
compensate her, he chose to avail himself of the bankruptcy laws
and spend his assets on personal luxuries. She would probably
resent him because his actions were wrong, and because he
deserves to be resented. Whether or not his actions were legal has
no bearing on how much resentment Geiger deserves. If
Missouri's bankruptcy laws were less favorable than he had hoped,
Dr. Geiger may have chosen a different way to keep his assets
away from Mrs. Kawaauhau. He may have snuck away to St.
Louis without anyone's knowledge and continued to practice
medicine on unsuspecting patients, depositing his assets in a local
St. Louis bank. Mrs. Kawaauhau would likely resent him no more
if he used these illegal means to stiff her. Whether Geiger uses
illegal tactics or bankruptcy exemptions, he deserves resentment
for finding a way to leave his victim uncompensated and poor
while he lives it up. Mrs. Kawaauhau would not think that the
doctor's financial savvy is a "far different, far more benign form of
outrageousness" 82 than if the doctor simply skipped town. She
resents the legal act as much as the illegal one because the former
is not morally different than the latter.
Mrs. Kawaahau would not be the only victim still filled
with resentment regardless of the legality of her offender's acts. A
pizza delivery boy would resent pizza thieves, and likely would
resent a cheating spouse much more and would resent a spouse
who only married him as part of a cruel trick to hurt his feelings
even more. We resent people more if their acts are more immoral.
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The fact that Mrs. Kawaauhau appropriately resents the doctor
regardless of his constructive use of the laws shows that, just
because we are unwilling to impose state-inflicted punishment on
someone, that does not mean that that person's actions were
morally superior to a crime.
Moral theorists have long recognized that resentment and
wrongness are inexorably connected. P. F. Strawson noted that
only by "attending to attitudes" such as resentment can we
"recover from the facts as we know them a sense of what we mean,
i.e. of all we mean, when, speaking the language of morals, we
speak of desert, responsibility, guilt, condemnation and justice.
83
We can tell that an act is wrong when we resent those responsible
for the act. Further, as R. Jay Wallace recently observed, "those
who have not done anything wrong clearly do not deserve to be
subjected to reactive emotions and the forms of sanctioning
treatment that express them."8 4 Of course, the committers of all
the unpunishable immoralities expressed above have done wrong
or else it would not be fair to resent them for their acts. They
would not deserve such resentment. The acts are no better than
criminal acts since we feel Dr. Geiger, Chad and Howard, and
many other savvy wrongdoers deserve much more resentment than
the petty pizza thief.
Doubters may not put as much stake in the "amount of
appropriate resentment" as the gauge of the wrongness of an
action. After all, such a measure is admittedly vague. One could
argue that punishable and unpunishable acts may both deserve the
same amount of resentment, but they do deserve different amounts
of punishment. It does not matter that perpetrators of seemingly
evil, unpunishable immoralities deserve to be resented much more
than common thieves. What is significant, one might argue, is that
people like Chad and Howard do not deserve to spend time in jail,
suggesting that they really do deserve better treatment and are less
morally bad. The discussion of "poetic justice"85 below shows that
83 Peter Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in 59 FREE WILL 78 (Gary Watson
ed., 1982).
84 JAY R. WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 135
(Harvard Univ. Press 1994).
5 ROBERT NozICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 369-70 (1981). I got the
idea about "poetic justice" from the remarks in this book.
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notwithstanding one's view about the explanatory force of
resentment, Chad and Howard did commit an act morally worse
than pizza theft and deserve treatment much worse than pizza
thieves, even if such treatment should not be doled out by the state.
B. Poetic Justice
Recall that near the beginning of this paper, I explained
three questions that could be asked when comparing two acts: 1)
which act was morally worse?; 2) which act deserves more
punishment?; and 3) which act should receive more punishment
from the state? I further claimed that standard retributivist
accounts would answer all three questions in the same way. One
who claims that the unpunishable immorality is significantly less
immoral than a petty crime does so by answering the three
questions the same. Professor Katz, for example, noted that the
bankrupt doctor should not be punished by the state (question
three). Hence, the doctor does not deserve punishment 86 (question
two) and did not behave morally badly (question one).87 However,
questions two and three should not always be answered the same
way. The notion of "poetic justice" 88 shows that people often
deserve punishment, even when the state should not inflict it.
Unpunishable immoralities are often more wrong than crimes since
the acts deserve worse punishment than criminal acts.
The notion of "poetic justice" that I am imagining can only
be explained through an example. Recall the example used above,
showing that certain types of verbal abuse seem undeniably
immoral, even if such acts are not punishable by the state.89 A
University of Wisconsin student, angry about comments a reporter
had made about the athletic department, "shouted loudly" at the
reporter for approximately twenty minutes, "calling her [obscene
names]." 9 Consider the following fabricated conclusion to the
86 Of course, debtors are not usually punished in modem times. The point still
holds for any case where the perpetrator abides by the, letter of the law
specifically to avoid criminal liability such as a car salesman that avoids illegal
fraud by artfully misleading a customer.
87 ILL-GOTTEN GAINs, supra note 24, at 132.
8 8 NozicK, supra note 85, at 3 69-70.
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incident: immediately after this vulgar tirade, the rude man
stormed out of the room in a hurry for effect. Unaware that
someone had closed the door to the room since he had begun
shouting, our student runs into the door, bruising his nose, and
causing an unruly bleed. Normally, this moderate misfortune is
regrettable, even if obtained in a somewhat comical fashion.
However, since the student committed the immoral act, there is a
sense that the vulgar student deserved to suffer this moderate
injury and indignity. Though we may be uncomfortable allowing
the state to force the student to work at a battered women's shelter,
he still does deserve to suffer. When the student stormed out of the
room and ran into a closed door, "poetic justice" occurred. 91
It is because of "poetic justice" that one can conclude that
just because the state should not punish a particular person, it does
not follow that the person deserves less punishment than a criminal
or that the person's act was not as immoral as a crime. The
question of how much punishment a person deserves is very
different from the question of how much punishment the state
should inflict. Though some may define punishment as suffering
inflicted by the state for the purpose of punishing,92  I am
considering punishment in a much broader sense. For my
purposes, punishment is simply suffering in connection to a
particular wrong. The rude student should not have been put in jail
for the night for his outburst, but when he hurt his nose, most
would say "he got (at least some of) the punishment he deserved."
The appropriate measure of the immorality of an act is not the
amount of appropriate state-imposed suffering, but the amount of
suffering that is deserved. The example of the rude student shows
that the amount of suffering (punishment) deserved is often
independent of the amount of suffering that the state should impose
through punishment.
The notion of "poetic justice" offered thus far must seem
far too ambiguous and far-fetched to explain how to measure
91 See generally NOZICK, supra note 85, at 369-70 (examining the notion of
"poetic justice" and what the author believes might constitute "poetic justice").
9 See Greenawalt, supra note 59, at 345. "Punishment is imposed by people
who have the authority to do so - authority conferred by legal rule, associational
standard, or social morality." Id.
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"deserved punishment." 93 Perhaps we find what happened to the
rude student pleasing simply out of an appreciation of irony or a
desire for vengeance. However, this sense of "poetic justice"
really does pervade judgement about how much punishment a
person deserves in the real world.
For example, a Philadelphia man, Kyle Irvin, was recently
put on trial for "carelessly leaving a loaded gun under a pillow
where his 3-year old son could find it and use it." 94 The 3-year old
found the gun, pointed it between his eyes, and pulled the trigger.
95
The day's newspaper story recounted the court room scene as
follows:
"I shouldn't have left the gun where he could reach
it," wept Irvin to himself after being taken into
custody, testified Police Officer Greg Holman.
"I can't believe this happened."
"This man is as much a victim as the boy," defense
lawyer Frank Spina told Municipal Judge Harvey
W. Robbins at the end of the preliminary hearing.
"This was a horrible, tragic accident," said Spina,
while urging the judge to reduce the charge to
involuntary manslaughter. "Clearly, my client did
not intend to kill this boy."
But [Assistant District Attorney] Fisk argued that under the
law, a parent has a special duty to see that a child is not put in
danger.V
6
Now, certainly I do not wish to claim that it was somehow
poetically just for Irvin to lose his son as a result of his morally
offensive recklessness. I offer the example to show that the
question of "what Irwin deserves for his bad act" is not only a
question of how -much state-imposed punishment should be
imposed, but more a question of how much he should suffer in
connection with his bad act. Irvin has suffered greatly because he
93 See NOZICK, supra note 85, at 370 (demonstrating that a person sentenced to
death for committing murder who falls ill the day before his execution would
probably be restored to health before proceeding with the execution in order to
receive the punishment he deserved).
94 Dave Racher, Dad Held For trial in Gun Death of 3-Year-Old Son,
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lost his son. It does not seem that he deserves to suffer much more
at the hands of the state. A certain amount of suffering (and not a
certain amount of state-imposed suffering) is connected to a bad
act. It is this amount of suffering that we should look to as the
"deserved punishment" that displays how immoral an act is.
A clearer, though less plausible, example may be necessary
to make the observation convincing. Consider a bank robber who
commits a crime worthy of twenty years imprisonment. Imagine
the bank robber escapes to a remote location where she
accidentally falls into an old mine and remains trapped for the next
twenty years. She is able to survive by drinking from an
underground spring and eating insects. Now, what should be done
at the end of this twenty-year period when an amateur archeologist
discovers the old mine and rescues the bank robber? Should she be
transferred straight from the mine to the federal prison to begin her
twenty-year sentence? Such treatment seems far too harsh. After
twenty years of suffering in prison-like conditions, it would be odd
to insist the bank robber now deserves twenty years of state-
imposed punishment.
Hence, the true measure of how much punishment an act
deserves is not how much the state should punish the person, but
how much total suffering the person deserves as a result of her
act.97 Philosophers have taken some notice of this subtlety. Robert
Nozick explained that the amount that the state should punish a
person for a bad act should be reduced if the wrongdoer has
already faced some detriment due to his act.98 If a person has been
forced to compensate his victim or if the offender was badly hurt
while the victim was defending himself, then, contends Nozick, the
state should punish the offender less than a similar offender who
has faced no such detriment.99 Alwynne Smart made the same
point by considering a reckless driver who discovers the pedestrian
that he recklessly injured was "his only child to whom he was
devoted." 100 Smart recognizes that it would not be just to punish
the offender as much as the reckless driver that killed a stranger.
Although it would be "irresponsible to suggest that remorse was
97 NOZICK, supra note 85, at 363.
9
' Id. at 364.
99 Id.
'0o Alwynne Smart, 43 MERCY 345, 348 (1968).
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sufficient to absolve a man of the consequences of a crime," Smart
notes that the man has already served part of what we consider a
morally just punishment. It is not that we are 'letting him off
lightly,' but simply that to impose the full penalty would be to
impose a total amount of suffering quite out of keeping with the
gravity of his crime.
10 1
A small qualification is necessary before asserting that the
amount of deserved suffering is the best measure of the immorality
of an act. This suffering must occur in connection with the moral
wrong. It is not enough that a bad person has suffered in her life.
Recall the hypothetical bank robber who fell into a mine while
escaping. If she was caught twenty years later having not fallen in
the mine, she might still try to make the following argument before
the jury: "The past twenty years have been horrendous. Everyone
in my family has died of a rare disease and I have no loved ones
left. I too came down with the rare disease and have spent the last
twenty years languishing in the hospital in excruciating pain. Only
recently have I gotten better and I am ready to go on with my life."
The jury may feel some sympathy for the bank robber, but it seems
her plight is not quite the kind of harm that reduces the amount of
punishment a person deserves in the same way as being forced to
compensate one's victim or being hurt in self defense.
I recognize that I have provided no account of what it
means for suffering to be "in connection to the wrong." Certain
forms of suffering seem obviously connected with the wrong
(having your child die as a result of your reckless behavior,
storming into a door immediately after you verbally abuse
someone), while other forms of suffering seem wholly unrelated,
such as having one's stocks plummet or having a parent die of
cancer. There will be cases more difficult to classify. Will it
matter if the bank robber caught the rare disease from the bank
teller? Will it matter if the bank robber could have been cured of
the rare disease after a few days, but avoided any large, reputable
hospitals for fear of' getting recognized as the bank robber? I am
not sure of the answer to these questions. The point is simply that
there are cases where the offender deserves less punishment due to
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Hence, the amount of punishment that a person deserves for her
wrong is not a function of how much the state should punish, but a
function of how much that person deserves to suffer by virtue of
her wrong. Now that it has been established that the proper
measure of the gravity of a moral wrong is how much the offender
deserves to suffer (be punished) in connection with the crime, we
are in a better position to assess the wrongfulness of the
unpunishable immoralities discussed throughout this paper. For a
retributivist who believes that punishment is based on an
offender's desert for a crime, the following identity should hold:
Degree of Moral Wrong = Punishment Deserved for Wrong
Now consider the tale of Chad and Howard, and the tale of
the pizza thieves. How much do the offenders deserve to suffer for
their bad act? When trying to pull their trick on Christine, Chad
and Howard might find that Christine is a crazed lunatic who finds
them out and beats them to a bloody pulp. There seems to be some
justice in this. It would not be right for Christine to make this
choice, but once this has occurred, one could not say, as before,
that Chad and Howard did not get what they deserved. Also, it
does not seem to be a grave injustice that Chad and Howard were
victimized by an insane woman. However, imagine the pizza
thieves met similar circumstances. It does not seem to satisfy our
desire for justice for the pizza delivery boy to be a homicidal
maniac who administers severe beatings to the pizza thieves. We
have much more sympathy for the pizza thieves than we do for
Chad and Howard. This is because Chad and Howard deserved
more punishment. Their act was more immoral than that of the
pizza thieves. It was not "far more benign" than a criminal act. If
it was, it would deserve less punishment.
Though terrible immoralities like those of Chad and
Howard illustrate the point best, the idea of "poetic justice"
highlights the immorality of all the unpunishable acts discussed in
this paper. Whether Dr. Geiger skipped town with his assets or
simply made himself judgement proof through exploiting
bankruptcy exceptions, we are still not saddened if we hear he lost
all his sneakily saved assets paying his own medical bills after his
own run-in with a bad doctor. Whether the vulgar University of
Wisconsin student slaps his victim or verbally abuses her, it still
seems just for him to hurt his nose storming into a closed door.
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The fact that we do not think it is proper for the government to step
in and do the punishing sometimes is related only to the way in
which we value liberty, and not to our moral assessment of how
much punishment an act deserves or how morally wrong an act is.
Certainly, state-enforced punishment seems worse than most other
forms of suffering. One philosopher did call state-imposed
punishment a form of "permanent disgrace."'' 2 Philosopher Jean
Hampton noted that state-imposed punishment was, in some ways,
a unique form of suffering because of the fact that "the wrongdoer
is made to suffer and [the suffering] represents his submission to
the wrongdoer."10 3 Thus, it is tempting to conclude that those who
deserve the terrible treatment known as "state-imposed
punishment" have conmitted the most morally wrong acts. But by
now it should be clear that this is not the case. A person who
deserves to spend a night in prison because of public drunkenness
will be made to submit to his punisher. However, if Chad and
Howard are beaten to a bloody pulp by Christine, if the bankrupt
doctor loses all of his assets, or if a vulgar student severely injures
his nose, the offenders will have suffered much more than the
offender who spent the night in prison. They deserve that suffering
because their act was more immoral than the minor impropriety of
being found drunk in public. Just because we value liberty and
will not allow the state to punish them for their acts, that does not
mean that their acts were less immoral than a crime.
IV. RETHINKING RETRIBUTIVISM: TAKING HEED OF
RIGHTS
Part two of this paper examined the multitude of cases
where the notion of retributive desert did not justify infringing on
the rights of immoral offenders. Retributivists often challenge
utilitarian justifications of punishment by pointing out that it is
impermissible to pinish an innocent person to reach some state-
related goal such as deterring further crimes. Imprisoning
someone violates her rights to pursue her own goals, live where
she wishes, and generally move about freely. These rights cannot
102 Feinberg, supra note 1.5, at 24.
103 JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 126
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be taken away simply to benefit others in society. As I have
suggested, however, the examples throughout this paper show that
the retributivist notion of moral desert is similarly deficient in
explaining why and when people's rights can be taken away by
state-imposed punishment. We cannot take away the rights of
individuals simply because they have committed moral wrongs.
In this part of the article, I will make some tentative
remarks about what a new theory of deontological justification of
punishment may look like, given that the examples in this paper
suggest that moral desert does not necessarily justify state-inflicted
punishment. I will observe that state-inflicted punishment occurs,
and may be somehow justified by, the infringement of the offender
on certain rights of others. I will examine more closely when the
state can take away the rights of certain individuals through
punishment and how this description of when punishment can
occur raises further problems for a retributivist account of
punishment. I will suggest that state-inflicted punishment is only
appropriate when offenders infringe on certain rights of others
such as an individual's right to bodily integrity or right to property.
Whether a person can be punished by the state seems to turn on
whether a certain type of right was violated, rather than if an act
reached a certain threshold of immorality.'0 4 Near the end of this
section, I will explore the possibility that, contrary to the position
taken in this paper thus far, moral desert has no place at all in
justifying state-imposed punishment. Indeed, the state may be
obligated to punish a person even if the person committed no
moral wrong at all and cannot be said to deserve punishment.
A. People Can Only Be Punished By The State When They
Violate Certain Rights Of Others
Above, I examined certain liberties, the infringement of
which could not be justified by the retributivist notion of moral
desert. However, this certainly does not mean state-imposed
punishment is never justified. Such liberties are not absolute. A
'04 I do not claim to give a normative reason why state-imposed punishment
should be justified when people violate certain rights or why the "certain rights"
I keep referring to are especially important.
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person's right to read Lady Chatterley's Lover'0 5 does not
immunize him from state-imposed punishment when he steals a
copy from a bookstore. One's right to play a cruel trick on an
unsuspecting acquaintance does not free him from state-imposed
punishment if he assaults the victim as part of the plan. This leads
to a fairly familiar and simple (if not simplistic) view of human
liberty: one has the right to do as one wishes as long as one does
not infringe on the rights of others. The problem with this credo is
its vacuity. What is meant by "rights" and "infringe"? The credo
sounds reasonable when justifying a limitation on trespassing by
saying my right to property limits your right to walk wherever you
wish. The credo sounds less reasonable when you tell me I can
never drive my car because of your right to clean air.
Despite the vacuity of this credo, it is still of use in
understanding how the criminal law operates. There are some
rights whose violation seem grounds for criminal punishment.
Recall the Wisconsin student guilty of nasty name-calling and
rudeness. 106 His act of retaliation did not violate the rights of his
victim. 0 7 Certainly, in some sense, she had a moral right not to be
treated so rudely. However, I am referring to a different grouping
of rights. People become candidates for state-imposed punishment
when they violate certain rights, such as a victim's right to bodily
integrity or property. 10 8 I am not sure what the magic of these
rights is and do not claim that this is a complete list of such rights.
Nonetheless, whether or not an act is punishable by the state seems
to turn on whether or not there was a violation of such a right. If
state-imposed punishment was justified by moral desert, it would
seem natural that acts would become punishable once reaching a
certain threshold of moral badness. Instead, it seems people are at
liberty to do as they wish until they violate particular rights of
others, at which point the state is able to punish the offenders.
1
05 D.H. LAWRENCE, LADY CHATTERLEY'S LOVER (Grove Press 1957).
'o6 UMWPost, 774 F. Supp. 1164.
°7 Id. at 1166.
108 LAFAVE, supra note 8, at § 1.5. The crimes of murder, manslaughter, assault,
battery, mayhem, rape, and kidnapping result from the violation of a victim's
right to bodily integrity while the crimes of larceny, embezzlement, false
pretenses, burglary, robbery, bad checks, blackmail, extortion, receiving stolen
property, arson, forgery, and malicious destruction of property arise from the
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This suggests that state-imposed punishment is justified in certain
instances not because the offender acted wrongfully, but because
the offender violated a particular right of another.
Admittedly, my account thus far has been vague. Even if
you are willing to accept that the criminal law prohibits violation
of the right to bodily integrity and the right to property, it is
unclear what it means to "violate" such a right. My right to bodily
integrity is violated when I am punched in the face. However, it
seems it will also be violated when someone unintentionally (and
non-recklessly) runs into me with her car. However, only the
former seems to be grounds for punishment of the offender. I
believe that of these two cases, a right has only been violated in the
case of the punch in the face. At least, it seems more like an
offender has blatantly disregarded and stomped upon one's rights
when the person intentionally punched another in the face for the
purpose of causing the individual harm. In fact, I do not think it is
even a detriment to the above theory that it is not always clear that
an offender has "violated a right." There will always be cases
where we are unsure if a certain practice should be grounds for
punishment. I only wish to argue that the question of whether
someone should be punished turns on whether a certain type of
right was violated. Examples follow.
Example One: Free Speech
First Amendment freedom is perhaps the best example. As
explained in Part II, having the freedom of speech entails the right
to speak, even if such speech in such circumstances would be
deemed immoral by nearly everyone. 10 9 However, all seem to
agree that the freedom of speech is not absolute. 110 One, of course,
cannot yell out "fire" in a crowded theater when nothing is on fire.
Each theatergoer has a right not to be trampled by others. That is,
people have a right to bodily integrity that is violated when
someone yells out "fire" in hopes of causing an injurious melee.
109 See TRIBE, supra note 29.
" 0 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
§11.3.3.2, 815 (Aspen Publishers 1997). The author states, "(i)t is well
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At first glance, this "fire" exception fits in nicely with the
retributivist account. Causing injury to large groups seems quite a
bit more immoral than the verbal assault by the aforementioned
Wisconsin student. Perhaps the reason the state will punish one
who yells "fire" is because that act deserves punishment more than
the act of screaming epithets. However, further examination of
First Amendment doctrine shows that what makes yelling "fire"
illegal is not the immorality of the act, but the fact that the fire-
yeller violated an important right in a way that the Wisconsin
student did not.II
The "fighting words" doctrine, 1 12 for example, carves out
an important exception to free speech that allows states to punish
people if they utter words with the intention of bringing "the
addressee to fisticuffs.""' 3 Originally, the Supreme Court defined
fighting words as "those which by their very utterance inflict injury
or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."'" 4  Many
courts determined that the first half of the definition, allowed the
state to outlaw utterances that bring about "psychological injury,
primarily in the form of emotional upset and injury to the
'sensibilities' of addressees."' 15 The second half of the definition
"addresses the prevention of physical retaliation."' 
16
However, the Supreme Court soon limited the "fighting
words" test to only its second half.' 17  Under this new
interpretation, people such as the Wisconsin student would not be
punished for causing "emotional upset" or "injury to the
sensibilities."" 8 The Court determined that speech is only limited
in this context when one's speech is "likely to provoke the average
11 Compare UMW Post, 774 F. Supp. at 1172 n.7 with Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 308 (1939) (holding that the power of the state to punish speech is
obvious when there is a clear danger of riot, disorder, or threat to public safety).
112 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
13 UMWPost, 774 F. Supp. at 1171.
114 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
" UMWPost, 774 F. Supp. at 1169.
16 Id. at 1169-70.
117 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 110, at 816. The author points out that although
the United States Supreme Court did not overturn Chaplinsky, it narrowed the
scope of the doctrine by restricting its application to only those words which
were specifically directed at another person, and which had the likelihood of
producing a violent reaction. Id.




Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2001
TOURO LAW REVIEW
person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace.""
9
Consequently, people are free to say what they wish, unless their
words are "likely to provoke violent reaction., 120 In the same way
that people have a right not be duped into rushing out of a theater
(and others have a right not to be trampled by those rushing out),
people also have a right not to be coerced into a violent reaction,
and not to be injured by others who have been coerced into one.
One's right to bodily integrity limits other individuals' rights to
free speech.
Notice that the illegalities of the acts are independent of
their immorality. If the Wisconsin student set out to get his victim
to fight back, he would hardly seem more morally odious than if he
did what he actually did set out to cause, severe "psychological
harm" by injuring the sensibilities of his victim. Perhaps more
pointedly, if Chad and Howard had picked a fight with Christine, it
would not have been more immoral than what they actually did -
set out to cause her severe psychological harm in hopes that she
would be severely traumatized.
Freedom of speech means that you can execute countless
immoralities until you violate certain rights of others. You may be
punished if your speech is construed to violate someone's right to
bodily integrity. 12 1 Additionally, freedom of speech certainly does
not include the right to lie about a product you are selling to
someone, or to deceive someone into giving you something that
does not really belong to you. 122 You cannot claim you have a free
speech right that allows you to dupe others out of their property.
Hence, other individuals' rights to property also limit the freedom
of speech of an individual.
119 Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969).
120 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
121 MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.4 states in pertinent part: "a person commits a
petty misdemeanor if, with purpose to harass another, he ... insults, taunts, or
challenges another in a manner likely to provoke violent or disorderly response."
Id.
122 See id. §§ 224.7 and 223.3. § 224.7(4) and (5) state in pertinent part:
"a person commits a misdemeanor if in the course of business he sells, offers
or exposes for sale ... mislabeled commodities..., or makes a false or
misleading statement in any advertisement.... ." Id. Section 223.3 states in
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However, the Supreme Court has determined that a right to
be free from "psychological harm" does not limit freedom of
speech.123  Indeed, their conclusion seems to fit our intuitions
about what it means to have certain liberties. In many cases, the
state cannot punish a person for bad acts because there are certain
rights that are not rights in the state-protected sense. These
unprotected rights include: the right not have one's spouse cheat,
the right not to have one's feelings hurt, and the right to have one's
life saved by a bystander, when it would be simple for the
bystander to do so. Consequently, people are free from
punishment as a result of speech unless certain rights are violated,
such as one's right to bodily integrity or property.
Example Two: Blackmail
There has been much discussion over the unusual case of
blackmail. The famous "paradox of blackmail" is as follows: If I
approached you and said "Pay me ten dollars, or I will give your
high-spirited, risk-addicted nineteen-year-old daughter a
motorcycle for a Christmas present,"' 24 I would be committing
criminal blackmail.' 25 However, if I simply gave the motorcycle
gift out of pure malice, or asked for the ten dollars without
mentioning the motorcycle, I would be acting perfectly within my
rights. 
26
This paradox highlights the importance of establishing the
violation of a right in judging if an act is punishable. No one
thinks that maliciously giving a motorcycle to a risk-addicted
nineteen-year-old is not immoral. In fact, it is likely more immoral
than the criminal blackmail case where one gives the victim-father
the much desired option of buying his daughter's well being for a
mere ten dollars. Blackmail theorists, instead, note that giving the
motorcycle is perfectly within the rights of the evildoer, while
123 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989).
124 ILL-GOTTEN GAINS, supra note 24, at 134.
125 MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4. Sections (1) and (7) provide in pertinent part:
"a person is guilty of theft by extortion if he purposely obtains property of
another by threatening to: inflict bodily injury on anyone or commit any other
criminal offense; or . . . inflict any other harm which would not benefit the
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blackmailing the father is not. 27 Blackmail certainly seems to
implicate the important right of property, so theorists go about
trying to explain why blackmail "violates" that right. 1
28
Professor Leo Katz, for example, concludes that blackmail
is illegal because it is analogous to theft cases. 129 The blackmail
threat of, "Give me money, or I will do X," is just a form of theft
like "Give me money or I will punch you in the nose."
1 30
Blackmail is punishable because it violates one's right to property
in the same way theft does.' 31 Taking money by threatening the
victim with the morally bad act of giving the motorcycle is
stealing, just as taking the money after threatening violence is
stealing. It is not relevant how morally repugnant the act of
blackmail is, it is only relevant that blackmail violates a right to
property.
Thus, to determine whether or not controversial cases like
free speech or blackmail should be illegal, one must look to see if
the acts are, in fact, a violation of a certain type of right. 132 This is
important for two reasons. First, it bolsters the position that the
relevant question for purposes of state-imposed punishment is
whether or not the person violated a right, as opposed to whether
the person exceeded some threshold of immorality. Second, it
shows that my focus on "the violation of a right" is not so vague as
to be unhelpful.
An example of an obvious violation of the right to bodily
integrity would be a punch in the face. Other acts, like shouting
racial epithets, are obviously not violations of bodily integrity. If
one wants to conclude that a more difficult case like negligent
127 id.
128 id.
129 Id. at 138-39.
13 Id. at 157-59.
'3' Id. at 138-39.
132 See LAFAVE, supra note 8, at § 1.5. The author states that the classification
of crimes in the criminal code is based on the interests of society against harm,
specifically: protection from physical harm to the person, protection of property
from loss, destruction or damage, protection of reputation from injury,
safeguards against sexual immorality, protection of the government from injury
or destruction, protection against interference with the administration of justice,
protection of the public health, protection of the public peace and order, and the
protection of other interests. Id.
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driving should be punishable, the person will need to argue that
negligent driving is more like obvious cases of bodily integrity
violations, and less like cases that obviously do not violate that
interest.
B. The Criminal Law's Focus on Whether an Offender
Violated a Right Is Incompatible with Retributive Views of
Punishment
Retributivists might grant that a person must violate a right
before she is subject to criminal punishment. However, a
retributivist might see this as simply another, necessary condition
of retributive punishment. 133 Therefore, once an offender violates
a certain type of right, then retributive punishment can fit the
appropriate state-imposed punishment to the moral desert of the
actor. However, the fact that an offender violates certain rights not
only affects whether a person can be punished by the state, but also
affects the amount of state-imposed punishment a person receives.
The amount of state-imposed punishment an offender
receives from the state turns mostly on the right the offender
violates.1 34 Recall the immoral non-rescuer from Part 11.135 Now
imagine that the man not only watches idly and maliciously as a
baby drowns, but out of pure malice, he spits on the drowning
baby. The man has now committed a battery and violated the
baby's right to bodily integrity. However, simply because the man
has violated a right, that does not mean state-imposed punishment
will now track his moral desert. A jury would likely not dole out a
punishment for something akin to murder. The man is morally
repugnant and likely deserves a great deal of punishment for letting
the baby drown. However, his state-imposed punishment will
correspond to the right that he violated (the right of the baby not to
be spit on) as opposed to his moral desert. It is not the case that,
once an offender violates a right, the state gives him the
punishment that he deserves.
133 David Dolinko, "Some Thoughts about Retributivism," 101 ETHIcs 537, 539
(1991).
134 id.
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A similar observation could be made if Chad and Howard
committed some minor crimes in their manipulation of Christine.
Imagine they stole her pizzas or spit in her face as a means of
painfully revealing that they were never in love with her.
Punishment would, for the most part, track the rights that Chad and
Howard violated as opposed to the immorality they displayed
when committing their illegal acts.' 
36
Even the retributivists' least controversial claim may be in
trouble, based on the importance of rights-violation in punishment.
A weak retributive claim is that, no matter what justifies,
punishment, or what sets the amount of punishment for a crime, an
offender cannot- be given more punishment than he morally
deserves.' 37 Retributivism is thought to set the ceiling on the
amount of punishment an offender may receive.138  However,
given the importance of rights-violations, even this weak claim
may be problematic.
Since state-imposed punishment turns on the violation of a
right, one wonders if there can be a case where a person violates a
right, but commits no moral wrong. If such a person should be
punished by the state, even the retributivists' weak claim does not
hold.
Such a case may be possible. Imagine that Chad is about to
go into the next room and slap Christine. A concerned co-worker
would certainly be within his rights to restrain Chad in an effort to
stop him from committing the assault. Now, suppose that Chad is
simply going into the next room to harshly and maliciously reveal
his scheme. The concerned co-worker feels he could lighten the
blow if he could get to Christine first. Thus, the co-worker does
his best to hold Chad back while sending a quick, heartfelt inter-
office e-mail to Christine.
136 id.
137 LAFAVE, supra note 8, at § 1.5. LaFave discusses limiting the rehabilitation
theory by borrowing from the retribution theory and making the punishment fit
the crime. Under this theory, once a criminal has served the commensurate time
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The compassionate co-worker could be punished for his
actions.139 Chad does have a right to go into the next room and
cause Christine emotional trauma. If someone holding him back
could not be punished by the state, then it could not be said that
Chad had such a right. Moreover, if he wished, Chad could throw
the compassionate co-worker to the floor while breaking free from
the co-worker's clutches. 140 Chad's right to defend himself in this
way shows that the co-worker had no right to do what he did, and
the co-worker should probably be punished for violating the rights
of Chad. It would be odd indeed to suggest that the co-worker had
no right to hold Chad back, but would face no consequences for
doing as he did. However, the compassionate co-worker did not
do anything morally wrong and does not deserve punishment.
Additionally, if the co-worker was slightly injured when thrown to
the ground, we would likely feel sorry for him and not think that
his injury was reflective of a just outcome. Also, unlike most
immoral actions, the co-worker would not regret trying to restrain
Chad, and would not teach his young children that such an act is
morally wrong. In fact, it unmistakably seems like the right thing
to have done under the circumstances. The co-worker "should" be
punished by the state, but he does not "deserve" to be punished. A
similar situation exists when a man is born into a large inheritance.
He "should" get his money, but could not be said to "deserve" the
money. Thus, it may not even be said that retributivism puts an
absolute limit on the amount of punishment a person should get
from the state.
The response to this line of reasoning may be to deny that
one can violate rights without acting immorally. A retributivist
might claim that it was in fact wrong to restrain Chad, regardless
of the consequences of not restraining him. However, certainly it
could not be immoral to commit a minor crime to spare Christine
such severe psychological harm. Imagine the co-worker simply
139 MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.3. Section 212.3 provides in pertinent part: "a
person commits a misdemeanor if he knowingly restrains another unlawfully so
as to interfere substantially with his liberty." Id.
'40 Id. at § 3.04. Section 3.04 provides in pertinent part: "the use of force upon
or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is
immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of
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locked Chad in the room or stole some money from Chad's desk in
hopes of distracting him. Such acts would certainly not be
immoral, but would be punishable by the state. 1
41
I began this part by noting that I was offering more of a
description of what is punishable by the state, as opposed to a
justification of what is punishable. Indeed, I have not offered any
reason why rights to bodily integrity or property give rise to
criminal punishment. The reason such description is important is
because of the way retributivists put forward their account of
punishment. A retributivist points to experience and intuition and
observes that people are punished when they have done something
to deserve some. sort of suffering. 142 However, the retributivists
have not explained why, seeing that offenders "get what they
deserve," is a reason to take away the rights of the offenders. The
utilitarian goal of protecting public safety is an end a state may use
to justify certain actions, but being certain that a person received
her "just deserts" is a vague notion that certainly does not move us
to action in other situations. To prove the point, David Dolinko
has used the example of a good son who deserved a sizeable
inheritance, but lost out to his undeserving brother.' 43 Certainly,
we are not moved to disrespect the wishes of the deceased, and we
do not give the inheritance to the "good son," although such an
action would fulfill the all-important principle of just deserts.' 44 It
seems that retributivists have not made much headway in
explaining why we can take away the rights of offenders for the
purposes of fulfilling just deserts. They simply have noted, as a
starting point, that state-imposed punishment seems to occur
because of the moral desert of the offender. 1
45
The point of this part of the article was to suggest that the
retributivists' starting point might not be the correct one. Neither
our intuition nor our experience necessarily suggests that state-
imposed punishment occurs when people deserve to suffer by
virtue of having committed a moral wrong. Rather, our intuition
and experience suggests that the rights of offenders can be taken
14l See id. §§ 212.3, 223.2(1).
142 Dolinko, supra note 133, at 555.
143 Id. at 544.
144 Id.
14 Id. at 542.
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away by the state when those offenders infringe on certain rights of
others. Perhaps this should be the relevant starting point for those
wishing to justify punishment. Theorists should ask what it is
about a certain set of rights that gives the state the ability to punish
those who violate those rights.
V. CONCLUSION: MORAL SUPERIORITY, HARSH
PUNISHMENTS, AND IMMORAL RECOMMENDATIONS
I have gone to great lengths to show that whether or not one
deserves punishment is very different than whether or not one
should be punished by the state. This important distinction calls
for a reformulation of the retributive justification of punishment if
it is to survive attack from those who believe punishment is
justified by some end other than moral desert.
I further believe that the difference between these two
concepts has more than academic importance. Mistaking moral
desert for appropriate, state-inflicted punishment gives rise to an
undue feeling of moral superiority. There is a general sense that
state-imposed punishment is reserved for the worst of moral
wrongs. 46 Hence, many law-abiding citizens may conclude that
those who commit crimes and are publicly punished by the state
are morally worse than average, law-abiding citizens are.
However, the broader view of punishment advocated in this paper
rejects this inference. State-imposed punishment is usually
inflicted for immoralities, but many people who commit heinous
immoralities are not punished by the state. An average law-
abiding citizen may or may not be more moral than the common
criminal, but such a citizen should not assume his moral
superiority based on his status as law-abider. Most of us have
committed acts at least as immoral as pizza theft, at least a few
times in our lives.
More importantly, this sense of moral distance between the
law-abiding citizen and the criminal may give rise to unjust
punishments. Imagine you committed some unpunishable wrong,
at least on par with petty theft. Perhaps you intentionally
146 See WALLACE, supra note 84, at 51 (noting that "to hold people morally
responsible is to be prepared to blame or sanction them for their moral offenses,




Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2001
TOURO LAW REVIEW
humiliated someone to aggrandize yourself, or committed an
infidelity in a serious relationship. Imagine further that you are
deeply regretful and feel you deserve the misfortunes or
resentment that may flow from your acts. Now suppose someone
was to suggest that you deserved suffering equivalent to the
suffering you would feel if you were imprisoned for an entire year.
You would likely find the suggestion preposterous. Such
punishment would be unduly harsh. Now recall the Illinois woman
from Part I who was forced to spend a year in jail for stealing
cigarettes from a supermarket. 147 This punishment seems harsh
and egregiously unjust, especially if one imagines that such a
punishment applying to any moral wrong equivalent to stealing
cigarettes. The fact that people have failed to separate the
difference between "moral desert" and "appropriateness of state
punishment" may often lead to unduly harsh punishments. Those
in power might not inflict such extremely harsh punishments if
they had the broader understanding of punishment and desert
advocated in this article. If legislators or sentencing judges had
considered what punishment they may have personally deserved
for a past wrong (on a level with cigarette theft), they would have
been much less likely to conclude that a year in prison was the
appropriate punishment for a wrong of that gravity.
Another big problem with confusing whether an act should
be punished by the state with whether an act is immoral is that
people may perpetrate horrible immoralities with the mistaken
belief that such acts are not immoral. However, the arguments in
this paper suggest that people should not ignore drowning babies,
play cruel tricks on co-workers, or leave their tort victims
uncompensated while they live the high life.
The wrongs committed by Chad and Howard discussed at
the beginning of this paper were shocking. The creator of the film
wanted the audience to feel that "the world is just not right."'148 I
hope the reader has gained some insight into why it is that the
world is full of terrible people who do not ever seem to get what is
coming to them. But the lesson I really hope that the reader has
gained is that good, evil, desert, and justice are not concepts that
only exist in the criminal law. Judgement about what one
147 Spence, 272 N.E.2d at 740.
148 See Labute, supra note 2.
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deserves, what is wrong, and what is right should be extrapolated
from the way we feel when we are wronged and when we wrong
others. The main difference between ourselves and those behind
bars is not our moral superiority, but our good sense to limit our
immoralities to acts which do not violate certain rights of others.
This is certainly not a difference worthy of the feeling that
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